Amazing. So the genesis story of this whole ELG concept in general, and Crossbeam in particular, is super interesting. You often hear in venture capital circles that VCs like to invest in companies where founders have experienced very directly a pain point and then start a company to address that pain point. The $2.6 billion mistake is that kind of a story on steroids. So I'd love for you to tell it.
Yeah, definitely. Another way of saying that VCs like to invest in repeat founders is that VCs like to invest in founders that have a chip on their shoulder, because a repeat founder that IPO'd their company and took $1 billion off the table may or may not actually be the best bet for the next $5 million check. But I think a founder that's gone through the full motions end to end and developed this really interesting blend of muscle memory and scar tissue that will kind of take them into their next business, knowing where to flex and lean into what they're strong at, but also knowing where to be cautious and be self-aware of their own weaknesses and build strengths around them.
That's a hell of a thing to start out with in terms of founding DNA. And I think that's, when I look back at my first two companies, RJMetrics and Stitch, precisely what kind of came out of them: a little bit of scar tissue and a little bit of muscle memory. So, to go into those stories really briefly, RJMetrics, I co-founded with a brilliant guy by the name of Jake Stein back in 2008, right in the heart of the Great Recession.
Great. So I worked at a venture firm. I worked at Insight Partners from '06 to '08. Jake and I quit on a Friday in September 2008, and on Saturday, Lehman Brothers collapsed. So we quit with all of this. We didn't plan to go out in a terrible market. Timing is everything. Timing, timing, timing. So, yeah, that business at its core, it was probably the earliest pure SaaS business in the business intelligence space. So dashboards, data pipelines, data warehousing, all in one siloed solution.
Most of our customers were e-commerce companies, and we would help them do things like suck in all of their payments data and their shopping cart data, and we'd tell them, hey, here's your customer lifetime value, here's a cohort analysis. Here's what your most valuable customers look like and how to get more of them. And it was a really interesting business because we were early, and it took a couple of years of kind of grinding it out with early adopters to really get the machinery working.
And then we had this beautiful, incredible window of product-market fit where it was flying off the shelves faster than we could even handle. And we took on venture money, and we scaled really aggressively, and we grew it into a pretty substantial business. And then just as quickly, we fell out of product-market fit as the modern data stack revolution happened. I know you had Tristan on recently talking about the modern data stack and the genesis of that over time. We were basically kind of systematically dismembered by the likes of Looker and Snowflake and the pieces whose sum was greater than what we could offer as a silo.
And what happened at the end of that is we were fortunate that we were able to have a decent outcome at RJMetrics. We got acquired by Magento, which soon got folded into Adobe. Adobe bought Magento for $1.68 billion, which was on the order of closer to 100x than 10x of what we sold for at RJ. The $2.6 billion mistake, it's really that, right? Which is this level of strategic awareness on not just being able to pick an idea that's going to be durable, but being self-aware of where the market is going and strategically mapping to that, always with a few years ahead in mind.
And also just being able to do the raw execution so that when you're hot, you make hay while the sun is shining, position yourself in such a way where you have an incredible posture that can be defensible against whatever the next incantation of the space that you're in might be. So I think we did all three of those phases like first-timers at RJMetrics. And one of the things that—and this is what leads to Crossbeam—that we witnessed there was, when we started really getting our lunch eaten by Looker, one of the things that was happening was that we realized we were extremely weak in terms of having ecosystem DNA in the way that our company worked.
We were a giant silo. So if you bought RJMetrics, it didn't really matter what other tools you had. It didn't really matter what else existed in the fabric of your company's technology stack. We were, from an experience standpoint, very much a single-player-mode kind of product that was consumed and bought and considered and valued almost more like traditional license-and-maintenance-style software products, as opposed to part of kind of a fabric of technology tools. And when the modern data stack emerged, it wasn't really RJMetrics versus Looker; it was RJMetrics versus Redshift data warehouse with some data pipeline technology in the middle and LookML's modeling language feeding end results into Looker dashboards.
So when people bought the alternative to RJ, they were actually buying four or five different products. And one of the superpowers that we saw all those products have is that when one of them had a company in their sales pipeline, that meant all of them had a company in their sales pipeline. Nobody bought just one piece of the stack. So that meant there was this really interesting demand generation and customer retention and loyalty motion that these companies could build by effectively having a rich, rich, rich interconnectivity of not the products, but the go-to-market organizations and the way that they sold those products.
And this is where this ecosystem-led growth strategy started to become really clear and crystallized for me. People think about partnerships, especially in the modern SaaS era, and they think about tech integrations. They think about partner teams doing press releases and, how have I integrated with you, and what does that mean from a kind of value proposition standpoint? And all that's very relevant. ELG doesn't really come into the fold until you start thinking about the ways in which your go-to-market team is actually leveraging those facts, the ways in which your sales pipelines cross-pollinate, the ways in which your messaging cross-pollinates, the ways in which you retain customers together and grow those customers together.
And in our world with RJ versus Looker, we started losing because we weren't just up against Looker's sales team, we were up against Amazon's sales team, we were up against Fivetran's sales team, we were up against anybody else in the stack. And not having that was a big eye-opener. So interestingly, we sell RJMetrics, and immediately on the heels of that, we started a company called Stitch Data, which was basically an if-you-can't-beat-them, join-them kind of play, where we started this business that was a direct competitor to Fivetran existing in the modern data stack.
And ironically, our number one partner in that business became Looker. So our worst enemy became our best friend really quickly. And man, did it work great. It had all the stuff, right? It was a PLG business. We had kind of a really awesome free trial to low price point. It was kind of consumption-based in how much people paid, and it fit. It snapped right into this really awesome, fast-growing ecosystem. And that meant that as a small company of 20 people or so with no new incremental outside funding, we were able to grow a pretty substantial business in a really short amount of time, really on the backs of almost purely ELG and PLG having this perfect marriage in the way that the business got built.
And the number one source of our referrals was all those same people in the modern data stack. It was the data warehouse providers who needed to get that next incremental data source into their databases. It was the business intelligence and dashboarding solutions who needed to build the next chart or dashboard, but the right data wasn't available. All of them sent their customers to Stitch in order to solve that problem, and that became our entire sales pipeline. So in 2018, we sold that business to Talend and found ourselves in this moment where there was an opportunity to go after Crossbeam.
And we can talk more about that, but that's kind of the through line: that back-to-back of RJMetrics and Stitch, the scar tissue from RJMetrics, the muscle memory from Stitch, that teed up the Crossbeam story being possible.