I'm tempted to go into Neeva a little bit since we are talking about it. So Neeva was what, 2019, 2020?
That was when the acquisition happened. In retrospect, was the company just a bit early to market?
Yes, two-ish years too early to market. If you were very—
Because it's effectively what Perplexity would be today, right? Is that fair?
That's fair. That is fair. We started along similar lines. The core thesis, again, was very simple, which was there must be a better way to do search. I'd worked on search and search-related products for 15 years, and I had come to the conclusion that if you start with things like, I am going to offer web links, I am going to show ads on top of those links, there was a limit to how much utility you could drive out of that product.
I'm proud, especially looking back at how well we ran Google Ads, especially search ads with that focus on quality. If you compare more recent platforms for search platforms, for example, App Store searches, they're truly terrible. Even when you ask highly precise questions, they will show you completely irrelevant ads. We were proud of the work that we did in search ads, but I also knew that the model had its limits. There's only so much you can push something, and the pressure to make money is always there.
You're always tempted to take that extra line of pixel because it was going to make you so much more money. In many ways, Neeva was a pure intellectual exercise of search is a really important function and we should be able to rethink it, but we didn't have the tools. I think we were two years too early in terms of creating, for example, a truly conversational experience. As soon as GPT-3 came out in 2022 and we began to understand—remember, in much of early—actually, it was '21 December.
In much of early 2022, you had to go to their silly playground and enter commands for GPT-3 to get answers. But we would start doing things like, hey, can you write what's called an abstractive summary of a page full of information? One of the hardest problems that there is. There is a technique called an extractive summary, which is you have a piece of text, you ask a question, but the question's answer is there in the text. The model just has to fetch that answer out.
Much easier problem to solve. If, on the other hand, you had like a 1,500-word blog and you told the model, in three sentences, in your own words, tell me what this blog is about, three, four years ago, this was an impossible problem. You just could not get sufficient quality. And GPT-3 was showing signs of actually solving problems like this, which is one—that was our light bulb moment for, hey, now we can actually create a search product that is all about summarizing a great answer from the best pages on the internet in order to answer your question.
We had working prototypes by mid-2022. And the launch of ChatGPT in December 2022 basically spurred nonstop work. I almost stopped sleeping, and we were cranking on what does the solution look like? And we launched sort of the true AI-powered search engine on January 6th, 2023, roughly four years. It was an amazing product. There are things that we did for disambiguation, for example. People's names are often very confusing if you use web search because there are many people with similar names.
And we figured out how to disambiguate different kinds of names. Lots of cool little techniques that made that product better. But I think you know this, Matt, companies have shelf lives. Once you've spent a certain number of years going at something, if you haven't achieved enough success, you also tend to accumulate a lot of cruft that becomes very hard to discard. And we decided that it was going to be very hard to sustain ourselves as an independent company and, much more importantly, to catch up to our valuation.
Because you had raised a bunch.
We had raised a lot of money. And in retrospect, it's again another one of these. I think there is virtue in taking, for example, just a few million dollars and saying the first version of a company needs to be built with five, six people in a relatively short period of time, and there needs to be some magic. And if there is not that magic, there is a structural problem. There is a lack of some kind of insight. I think the fact that we were in a zero interest rate environment blinded us to some of these things.
We raised too much money. Our valuation was $300 million for a company barely making a million. That just was not okay. And I had serious doubts, not about raising the next round. Unfortunately, we were an AI company. We could have raised another round.
But I had serious doubts about being able to catch up to our valuation. If you're saying, if I need to be a responsible company in 2024, and I should be valued at no more than, take your pick, 20 to 30 times your revenue—you're not even talking profit—that just looked harder and harder to achieve. And that was the main reason why I said we were throwing kind of good time after bad and good money after bad. And we basically sought a place where the expertise—and we had a lot of it, amazing people, amazing expertise in search, in AI—and we looked for a place where we could deliver a lot of value.
And Snowflake became that place. I was an afterthought for the acquisition. My original agreement with Frank, the Snowflake CEO, was that I would stay with Snowflake for six months. I said, I will help you get the team integrated. I will help you set up a strategy for AI, and I will leave end of '23 and figure out what I want to do. And that was very much my plan. This thing of becoming Snowflake CEO was very much an accident and a little bit of a happenstance that came together.
Thinking about your background, I guess that's how the company and Frank Slootman positioned, at least in the public announcements, the choice that they made to have you become the CEO: that you have this deep product and database and AI background at a time where, precisely to the beginning of this conversation, the big story became to shift from where the company was to what it is today. Because you go way back. I was checking your background. So you were at IIT, then Brown, then Bell Labs, then Epiphany.
But even at Epiphany, you were a senior manager or whatever the title was. You can tell me, focusing on machine learning systems, right?
That's correct. Epiphany was an analytics company turned into a customer relationship management company. We were all about big data and analytics back then, built on top of systems like Oracle and DB2. And absolutely, we worked on machine learning algorithms there. And so this is—
To anyone thinking that AI is a new thing.
Yeah. Snowflake is something that brought a lot of my interests together in life into one place. I have a lot of expertise, a lot of experience with big data going back to my PhD days, going back to the work in query processing at Bell Labs, also at Epiphany. Much of the early work that I did at Google was again on data-centric systems, on serving systems that were high performance, but also data processing systems that were incredibly high performance. I had the privilege to work with people like Shiv Venkataraman, who is now at Google, on building some of the largest log joining systems in the world.
If you got logs of every impression that we serve, just imagine how much that was. And we had to join them with clicks. This was back in 2006 and 2007. All of that experience then combined with machine learning and AI, being at Snowflake felt very much like coming home. I was like, this is a place I love. And I met a lot of customers. They love Snowflake. That's part of what made me decide that I'd be happy spending five or ten years at this place.